Ideology and the Study of Judicial Behavior

Abstract

Abstract This chapter explores the role of ideology in the study of judicial behavior. From the antecedents of the attitudinal model to newer strategic accounts, ideology plays a key role in political science explanations of judging. Measuring ideology in this context is quite difficult. This chapter describes the strengths and weaknesses of various strategies, including the political party of the judges, exogenous measures developed by Segal and Cover from newspaper editorials, and endogenous measures developed by Martin and Quinn using observed behavior. Empirical studies employing these measures show strong patterns of ideological behavior on the U.S. Supreme Court, with mixed findings for the lower courts.

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