Ceteris Paribus Hedges: Causal Voodoo that Works

Abstract

By prefacing a hypothesis with the words ceteris paribus, I appear to protect it from potential exceptions that I do not have the power to specify, even in principle. This paper provides a theory of ceteris paribus hedges according to which they deliver on this prophylactic promise. The theory is limited to causal generalizations, that is, to hypotheses that are intended to articulate the consequences of a causal mechanism; the scope of such a hypothesis, and thus what it says, depends, I propose, in part on the—perhaps unknown— nature of the mechanism whose consequences it is intended to describe. It follows from this view that the truth conditions for causal hypotheses are typically opaque to their own formulators. The paper concludes with a dis-cussion why opacity might benefit, rather than hinder, causal investigation. 1 1.

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