Single Till or Dual Till at Airports: A Two-sided Market Analysis

Abstract

Big airports profits are more and more often coming from commercial activities such as retailing. However, commercial services are relatively far from the original mission of the airport: providing airlines with aviation services such as ground handling, terminal management or airside operations, and being regulated for that because of an obvious dominant position with respect to airlines. For this reason, one can advocate for the separation of the two activities, i.e. for a dual till approach, in which only the aeronautical activity is regulated. We, instead, suggest that a single till regulation, in which the total profit of the airport is examined, is relevant because it allows to take into account the externalities existing between retailing and aeronautical services. Using a two-sided market approach (Armstrong, 2006, Rochet-Tirole 2003, 2006), we show that the airport is a platform which makes the shops and the passengers meet. The retailing activity depends on how many passengers are circulating and connecting at the airport, as well as the time they spent in the airport, while passengers value the least connecting time as possible. We show that the aeronautical tax can be either higher or lower under single till depending on whether the impact of the passengers demand or of the waiting time is the more important for the shops.

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