Can We Really See a Million Colours?

Abstract

Nearly all philosophers assume that human beings are capable of well over a million different conscious visual responses to coloured surfaces (and they then debate whether this shows that some mental representation is non-conceptual). This chapter denies the premise. The chapter argues that humans are capable of only a limited range of colour responses to surfaces presented singly (along with a gestalt ability to register that adjacently presented surfaces are different-in-colour). This may be counterintuitive, but it accommodates the empirical data better than the standard view. The argument the chapter puts forward also has the advantage of resolving various philosophical puzzles.

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