Presuppositions, Conventional Implicature, and Beyond: A unified account of projection

Abstract

We define a notion of projective meaning which encompasses both classical presuppositions and phenomena which are usually regarded as non-presuppositional but which also display projection behavior—Horn's assertorically inert entailments, conventional implicatures (both Grice's and Potts') and some conversational implicatures. We argue that the central feature of all projective meanings is that they are not-at-issue, defined as a relation to the question under discussion. Other properties differentiate various sub-classes of projective meanings, one of them the class of presuppositions according to Stalnaker. This principled taxonomy predicts differences in behavior unexpected on other models among the various conventional triggers and conversational implicatures, while holding promise for a general, explanatory account of projection which applies to all the types of meanings considered. 1. Projective meanings as a domain of study The observation that presuppositions project is a venerable one: in the modern era, it goes back to Frege's (1892) observation that the implication that the name Kepler has a referent arises equally from the assertion that Kepler died in misery and from the assertion of its negation, and similarly for descriptions such as whoever discovered the elliptical form of the planetary orbits. In the current literature, projection is understood rather differently—in more syntactic terms—than it is in Frege's brief remarks. 1 The phenomenon as standardly understood can be characterized as follows:

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