The Routledge Companion to Free Will

Abstract

In this chapter I review recent work on neuroscientific threats to free will. What is it for something to threaten free will? Consider, first, an apparent threat. You are walking in the dark, and a shadow looms in the distance. It certainly appears threatening, but you are not sure. What do you do? You consider the source of the threat (the thing casting the shadow, and you attempt to discover whether the threat is actual (an attacker) or merely apparent (a tree). And if the threat is actual, you attempt to discern what epistemic and behavioral changes are required of you. It is clear that recent work in neuroscience – along with recent work in psychology, for which see (Miller, this volume) – represents at least an apparent threat. This is why the issue has received so much attention in the popular press, and in the scientific and philosophical literatures. What we are now trying to do is discern whether the threat is actual or merely apparent. If it is actual, then we will have to consider what epistemic and behavioral changes are required of us. If it is merely apparent, then we can go on our way. Two questions will guide my discussion below. First, does current neuroscience present an actual threat? This involves consideration of the main neuroscientific results taken to threaten free will. I do this in the next two sections, “Seemingly Threatening Results,” and “Do These Studies Actually Threaten Free Will?” Second, how does (or might) neuroscience threaten free will? This involves consideration of the source and nature of the apparent threat. Importantly, even if current neuroscience presents no threat, future neuroscience might. Understanding the nature of the apparent threat ought to help us as we look for emerging threats in the near future. In “How Might Neuroscience Threaten Free Will?” I consider recent work that is relevant to this question.

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