The Impact of Adverse Selection and Risk Propensity on Managers’ Project Evaluation Decisions

Abstract

This study aims to partially replicate and extend prior escalation of commitment (e.g., Harrell & Harrison, 1994; Harrison & Harrell, 1993). It extends prior studies by examining the impact of risk propensity on managers’ project evaluation decisions. In addition, the study examines the joint effects of private information, potential for personal gain, and risk propensity on managers’ project evaluation decisions. A laboratory experiment involving 146 subjects was conducted to test the various hypotheses developed for this study. The results are consistent with prior studies, suggesting that managers exhibit a greater tendency to continue unprofitable projects under conditions of private information and potential for personal gain. Furthermore, the results reveal that managers with high risk propensity exhibit a greater tendency to commit additional resources to unprofitable projects than those with low risk propensity. The results support the proposition that high risk propensity managers who experience conditions of private information and potential for personal gain exhibit a greater tendency to commit additional resources to unprofitable projects than low risk propensity managers who experience only one or neither of these conditions.

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