The failure of Anti-Corruption Policies A Theoretical Mischaracterization of the Problem

Abstract

With an increased awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption on development,\nstrategies to fight it are now a top priority in policy circles around the world. Since\nAfrica is home to most of the thoroughly corrupt countries in the world, it is no\ncoincidence that the African continent has been the major target of this movement. To\ndate, however, few successes have resulted from the investment. In fact, in some\ncountries corruption even seems to have become more entrenched in step with the\nefforts to curb it. The aim of this paper is to advance an explanation to why this is the\ncase. Drawing upon the cases of Kenya and Uganda – two arguably typical African\ncountries when it comes to the problem of corruption and anti-corruption reforms –\nwe argue that contemporary anti-corruption reforms in Africa have largely failed\nbecause they are based on a mischaracterization of the problem of corruption in\ncontexts with systematic corruption. More specifically, our analysis reveals that while\ncontemporary anti-corruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption\nas a principal-agent problem, in the African context corruption rather seems to\nresemble a collective action problem, making the short-term costs of fighting\ncorruption outweigh the benefits. Consequently, even if most individuals morally\ndisapprove of corruption and are fully aware of the negative consequences for the\nsociety at large, very few actors show a sustained willingness to fight it. This, in turn,\nleads to a breakdown of any anti-corruption reform that builds on the principal-agent\nframework.

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