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Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets
16 references·2 citing·29 second hop
Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets (2018)Efficiency and Stability in Large Matchin…The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (2011)The Combinatorial Assignment …Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets (2009)Incentives and Stability in L…The New York City High School Match (2005)The New York City High School…The Boston Public School Match (2005)The Boston Public School MatchSchool Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach (2003)School Choice: A Mechanism De…A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement (1999)A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Stu…Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems (1998)Random Serial Dictatorship an…The Value of Purchase History Data in Target Marketing (1996)The Value of Purchase History…Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. (1992)Two Sided Matching: A Study i…The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives (1982)The Economics of Matching: St…Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm (1981)Machiavelli and the Gale-Shap…The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions (1979)The Efficient Allocation of I…On cores and indivisibility (1974)On cores and indivisibilityOn Cores and Indivisibility (1973)On Cores and IndivisibilityThe stable marriage problem (1971)The stable marriage problemCollege Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…Fair Matching under Constraints: Theory and Applications (2023)Fair Matching under Constrain…Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching (2020)Efficiency, Justified Envy, a…Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match (2009)61. Capitalism and Freedom (2002)Matching and Sorting in Online Dating (2010)Philosophy and Public Affairs (2000)Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (2001)Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications (2013)The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare (2016)The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare (2019)College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)The assignment game I: The core (1971)A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem (2001)The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory (1984)Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets (2007)Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior (1972)A Probabilistic Choice Model for Market Segmentation and Elasticity Structure (1989)Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry (1998)A Practitioner's Guide to Estimation of Random-Coefficients Logit Models of Demand (2000)Impact of Online Consumer Reviews on Sales: The Moderating Role of Product and Consumer Characteristics (2010)Pairwise kidney exchange (2005)Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences (2012)A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks (1996)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Contrasting Computational Models of Mate Preference Integration Across 45 Countries (2019)The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic DesignMatching with Contracts (2005)Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market (1993)The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework (1999)
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References

  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage5,978 cited
  • 1992Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.1,625 cited
  • 2003School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach1,572 cited
  • 1974On cores and indivisibility1,254 cited
  • 1982The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives897 cited
  • 2011The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes767 cited
  • 1996The Value of Purchase History Data in Target Marketing754 cited
  • 1981Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm655 cited
  • 2005The New York City High School Match655 cited
  • 1998Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems612 cited
  • 1973On Cores and Indivisibility584 cited
  • 1999A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement567 cited
  • 1979The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions553 cited
  • 2005The Boston Public School Match531 cited
  • 1971The stable marriage problem386 cited
  • 2009Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets

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362 cited

Cited by

  • 2020Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching55 cited
  • 2023Fair Matching under Constraints: Theory and Applications55 cited