Chapter 4 Anticorruption Policies: Lessons from the Lab

Klaus Abbink A · Danila Serra

100 citations0/0 files storedResearch in experimental economics

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Corruption and Economic Development Taxation and Compliance Studies Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

We review the existing laboratory experimental studies on corruption that have generated results with clear policy implications. We present and discuss experimental findings on the role that both monetary incentives and nonmonetary motivations may play in corruption decision-making, and, hence, in the fight against corruption.

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1995Corruption and Growth 1970Political Order in Changing Societies 1995INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS‐COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES 2000The causes of corruption: a cross-national study 1993Corruption 2017Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues 1964Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption 2000Corruption and government: causes, consequences, and reform

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