Chapter2005

FURTHER EVIDENCE ON INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE VALUE

39 citations0/0 files storedAdvances in financial economics

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Corporate Finance and Governance Financial Markets and Investment Strategies Financial Analysis and Corporate Governance

Abstract

Whether institutional investors monitor corporations and improve firm value is a key question for corporate governance and investment management. I find little empirical support for the hypothesis that institutions undertake monitoring that increases firm quality and valuation. Granger causation tests show that while quality firms do attract institutional investment, institutions do not monitor and firm value subsequently declines. Instead, institutional incentives are critical; some institutions with strong incentives to monitor do, indeed, monitor. Institutions with concentrated portfolios successfully monitor while institutions with a larger percentage stake do not. Pensions and endowments are better monitors than insurers, banks and mutual funds.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 39 citations exist upstream.

References

1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 1979Distribution of the Estimators for Autoregressive Time Series with a Unit Root 1977Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control 1997A Survey of Corporate Governance 1973Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests 1933The Modern Corporation and Private Property 1988Management ownership and market valuation 1996Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors

Cited by

2015Culture, corporate governance and analysts forecast in Malaysia 2008Does Corporate Governance Matter 2009Institutional investors and director remuneration: do political connections matter?2009Institutional Ownership and Income Smoothing by Japanese Banks through Loan Loss Provisions 2014Pengaruh Likuiditas Dan Kepemilikan Institusional Terhadap Nilai Perusahaan Dimoderasi Oleh Kebijakan Dividen 2018Board diversity and total directors’ remuneration: evidence from an emerging market

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.