Presentations and the Status of Theories

Abstract

Accounts of the structure of scientific theories in twentieth century philosophy of science have tended to focus on epistemological questions to the near exclusion of the metaphysical consequences of their solutions. This emphasis can be understood as resulting from the interest and concerns of the logical positivist movement and continued by proponents of the so-called “received view” of theories (Suppe 1977). One area where this division of interest has been a barrier to progress is understanding the growth of scientific knowledge. While philosophers as diverse as Nagel, Hempel, Kuhn, and Lakatos have attempted to explain the historical course of science, they have largely built their views on foundations designed to explicate the relation between theories (paradigms, scientific research programs) and the world. Thus, the received view's model of progress via theory (or indeed, whole science) reduction (e.g., Nagel 1961) rests on its largely syntactic/logical account of theory structure.

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