SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
I — Paul Boghossian
0 references·16 citing·54 second hopsampled
I — Paul Boghossian (2003)I — Paul BoghossianFunction-Based Conceptual Engineering and the Authority Problem (2022)Function-Based Conceptual Eng…Why Ideal Epistemology? (2021)Why Ideal Epistemology?Inferring by Attaching Force (2019)Inferring by Attaching ForceWhat reasoning might be (2016)What reasoning might beReasoning as a source of justification (2013)Reasoning as a source of just…Communist Conventions for Deductive Reasoning (2013)Communist Conventions for Ded…Against Boghossian, Wright and Broome on inference (2013)Against Boghossian, Wright an…Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations* (2012)Reverse Engineering Epistemic…Intuitions for inferences (2012)Intuitions for inferencesWhat are Thick Concepts? (2011)What are Thick Concepts?Epistemic Entitlement (2011)Epistemic EntitlementTHE RELIABILITY CHALLENGE AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF LOGIC (2010)THE RELIABILITY CHALLENGE AND…How Are Basic Belief‐Forming Methods Justified? (2008)How Are Basic Belief‐Forming …Thought-experiment intuitions and truth in fiction (2007)Thought-experiment intuitions…RULE‐FOLLOWING WITHOUT REASONS: WITTGENSTEIN'S QUIETISM AND THE CONSTITUTIVE QUESTION (2007)RULE‐FOLLOWING WITHOUT REASON…Believing one’s reasons are good (2007)Believing one’s reasons are g…A Treatise of Human Nature (1739)Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (1956)Convention: A Philosophical Study. (1970)Supererogation Across Normative Domains (2016)Knowledge as Acceptable Testimony (2017)The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759)Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990)The Origin of Concepts (2000)Immoderately rational (2013)An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support (2016)Uniqueness and Metaepistemology (2016)Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. (1979)Frege : Philosophy of language. By Michael Dummett. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981. Pp. xliii, 708. (1983)On the Plurality of Worlds (1986)Moral Epistemology: The Mathematics Analogy (2012)Justification and Explanation in Mathematics and Morality (2015)Debunking and Dispensability (2016)Naming and Necessity (1972)Concepts (1998)The Philosophy of Philosophy (2007)Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements (2011)Metaphysics as modeling: the handmaiden’s tale (2012)Knowledge and the Gettier Problem (2016)WHAT THE TORTOISE SAID TO ACHILLES (1895)Epistemology and Cognition (1987)Epistemology and Cognition. (1989)How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism? (2008)The Metaphysics of Representation (2020)Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (2006)Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law (2013)Thick Concepts (2013)Profit and Other Values: Thick Evaluation in Decision Making (2017)Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. (1987)Comment on Paul Boghossian, “What is inference” (2012)What is inference? (2012)The Hereby-Commit Account of Inference (2020)Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. (1957)Philosophical Investigations. (1967)Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. (1984)Blind Rule-Following (2012)BLIND RULE-FOLLOWING AND THE ‘ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON (2015)The Animal in Epistemology (2016)Individualism and the Mental (1979)Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (1984)On a confusion about a function of consciousness (1995)Reactive Attitudes as Communicative Entities (2013)Assertion: A Function First Account (2016)Conceptual Innovation, Function First (2019)Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness (1972)Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability (1973)The Essential Tension (1977)Idealization in Epistemology (2023)Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)? (2023)Bounded rationality (2024)
this work references cited by second hop· second hop is a sample of the most-cited connections

References

No references inside the corpus for this window.

Cited by

  • 2012Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations*195 cited
  • 2008How Are Basic Belief‐Forming Methods Justified?160 cited
  • 2011Epistemic Entitlement159 cited
  • 2007Thought-experiment intuitions and truth in fiction141 cited
  • 2010THE RELIABILITY CHALLENGE AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF LOGIC134 cited
  • 2007RULE‐FOLLOWING WITHOUT REASONS: WITTGENSTEIN'S QUIETISM AND THE CONSTITUTIVE QUESTION131 cited
  • 2011What are Thick Concepts?101 cited
  • 2013Against Boghossian, Wright and Broome on inference101 cited
  • 2013Communist Conventions for Deductive Reasoning93 cited
  • 2021Why Ideal Epistemology?91 cited
  • 2016What reasoning might be79 cited
  • 2022Function-Based Conceptual Engineering and the Authority Problem78 cited
  • 2007Believing one’s reasons are good77 cited
  • 2012Intuitions for inferences63 cited
  • 2019Inferring by Attaching Force63 cited
  • 2013Reasoning as a source of justification62 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work