The Risk-Averting Game of Transport Public-Private Partnership

Abstract

With both the demand for mobility and nationwide fiscal stress increasing, governments at all levels are interested in public-private partnerships as a way to introduce private investment to the public transport infrastructure. Although transport PPPs offer great promise, their complexity entails unusual risks for the investment environment, the project, and the partnership itself. Adopting the lens of game theory, this article traces the evolution of the State Route 91 Express Lanes (91EL) PPP over the past two decades and analyzes the risk-averting behavior of the players in the transport PPP game. The odyssey of 91EL demonstrates that managing transport PPPs requires understanding of the nature of the game, recognition of sectoral differences, the skill to concert divergent interests, willingness to change and learn, and the courage to take risks and explore practical solutions in an erratic political and economic environment.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 36 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.