Unilateral Home State Regulation: Imperialism or Tool for Subaltern Resistance?

Abstract

Home state reluctance to regulate international corporate activities in the human rights context is sometimes characterized as an imperialistic infringement of host state sovereignty. This concern may be explicit, or it may be implicit in an expressed desire to avoid conflict with the sovereignty of foreign states. Yet, in the absence of a multilateral treaty directly addressing business and human rights, a regulatory role for home states in preventing and remedying human rights harms is increasingly being suggested. This paper seeks to explore theoretical perspectives that support unilateral home state regulation. Having established that unilateral home state regulation could serve as a catalyst for international norm creation, the paper will explore whether--despite its potential benefits--such regulation is inevitably imperialistic. In order to answer this question, this paper will draw upon the work of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) scholars to critique the customary international law process.

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