The Functions of Affect in the Construction of Preferences

Abstract

A major theme that emerges from judgment and decision-making research is that we frequently do not know our own “true” value for an object or situation (e.g., how much we value a consumer good or better air quality). In such cases we appear to construct our values and preferences “on the spot” when asked to form a particular judgment or to make a specific decision (Payne, Bettman, & Schkade, 1999; Slovic, 1995). The present chapter focuses on the role of affect and the affect heuristic in the construction of preferences and extends earlier work on the affect heuristic by explicating four proposed functions of affect in the construction process. Recent research has developed and tested theories of judgment and decision making that incorporate affect as a key component in a process of constructing values and preferences. Within these theories, integral affect (positive and negative feelings about a stimulus) and incidental affect (positive and negative feelings such as mood states that are independent of a stimulus but can be misattributed to it) are used to predict and explain a wide variety of judgments and decisions ranging from choices among jelly beans to life satisfaction and valuation of human lives (Kahneman, Schkade, & Sunstein, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). THE FUNCTIONS OF AFFECT IN CONSTRUCTING JUDGMENTS AND DECISIONS Mild incidental affect and integral affect are ubiquitous in everyday life.

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