Judicial Review of Executive Power in the Singaporean Context, 1965–2012

Abstract

Abstract This article provides the first empirical analysis of court decisions that review the exercise of executive power, or judicial review, in Singapore, a single-party-dominated state known for its use of law to achieve economic progress and curtail civil-political liberties. Our findings suggest that judicial review could have the effect of buttressing the ruling party’s legitimacy while deferring to the executive’s curtailment of dissent and civil-political liberties, thus reinforcing the political status quo. We also find judicial review to be a scarcely utilized recourse. The article contributes to the study of law and courts, particularly administrative law in nonliberal regimes.

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