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Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies
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References

  • 1983Separation of Ownership and Control19,446 cited
  • 2007z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments9,517 cited
  • 1990Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives5,080 cited
  • 2008Executive compensation2,390 cited
  • 1988Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory1,719 cited
  • 1994Learning in and about complex systems1,279 cited
  • 1987The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives960 cited
  • 1989Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers954 cited
  • 1999Executive Compensation920 cited
  • 1985Delegation and the Theory of the Firm786 cited
  • 1999Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence734 cited
  • 2004Remuneration: Where We've Been, How We Got to Here, What are the Problems, and How to Fix Them716 cited
  • 1984Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly688 cited
  • 1989Delegation and the theory of the firm670 cited
  • 1990Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bank CEOs362 cited
  • 1987Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions

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