Form-driven vs. Content-driven Arguments for Realism

Abstract

I offer a meta-level analysis of realist arguments for the reliability of ampliative reasoning about the unobservable.We can distinguish form-driven and content-driven arguments for realism: form-driven arguments appeal to the form of inductive inferences, whilst content-driven arguments appeal to their specific content.After regimenting the realism debate in these terms, I will argue that the content-driven arguments are preferable.Along the way I will discuss how my analysis relates to John Norton's recent, more general thesis that the grounds for licit induction are always material.

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