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Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Receivers
16 references·3 citing·39 second hop
Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Receivers (2015)Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Receive…Bayesian Persuasion (2011)Bayesian PersuasionPersuasion by Cheap Talk (2010)Persuasion by Cheap TalkOptimal Information Disclosure (2010)Optimal Information DisclosureIn Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and Strategic Voting (2000)In Defense of Unanimous Jury …Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting (1998)Convicting the Innocent: The …Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents (1998)Consequences of the Condorcet…Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information (1997)Voting Behavior and Informati…Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem (1996)Information Aggregation, Rati…The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes (1992)The Condorcet Jury Theorem, F…CHEAP TALK WITH TWO AUDIENCES (1989)CHEAP TALK WITH TWO AUDIENCESMultidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design (1988)Multidimensional incentive co…Relying on the Information of Interested Parties (1986)Relying on the Information of…Strategic Information Transmission (1982)Strategic Information Transmi…The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality (1981)The Informational Role of War…Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Good News and Bad News: Repre…Job Market Signaling (1973)Job Market SignalingBayesian persuasion under partial commitment (2021)Bayesian persuasion under par…Divide and Inform: Rationing Information to Facilitate Persuasion (2017)Divide and Inform: Rationing …The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: A Bayesian persuasion perspective (2016)The optimal disclosure policy…COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)The American Jury (1971)Information Pooling and Group Decision Making (1986)Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem (2001)Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science (2011)The Handbook of Organizational Economics (2013)The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)Innovating Democracy (2008)Self-Enforcing Democracy (2011)Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix (2014)American Economic Review (2019)Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets (2003)Position Auctions with Consumer Search (2011)Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach (2014)Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design (2019)The Strategy of Conflict (1960)Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria (1987)Herd Behavior and Investment (1988)Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes (1994)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles (1987)Radio's Impact on Public Spending (2004)A Theory of Participation in Elections (2006)Voluntary disclosure with a strategic opponent (1990)Investor psychology in capital markets: evidence and policy implications (2002)The Economics of Privacy (2016)An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organizations (1988)Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections (1994)Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment (2010)The Effect of Newspaper Entry and Exit on Electoral Politics (2011)Promotional Reviews: An Empirical Investigation of Online Review Manipulation (2014)Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2019)
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References

  • 1973Job Market Signaling16,329 cited
  • 1982Strategic Information Transmission4,289 cited
  • 1981Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications3,198 cited
  • 1981The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality2,491 cited
  • 2011Bayesian Persuasion1,913 cited
  • 1986Relying on the Information of Interested Parties1,080 cited
  • 1996Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem1,063 cited
  • 1998Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting725 cited
  • 1997Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information607 cited
  • 2010Optimal Information Disclosure487 cited
  • 1992The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes475 cited
  • 2000In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and Strategic Voting311 cited
  • 1988Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design281 cited
  • 1989CHEAP TALK WITH TWO AUDIENCES271 cited
  • 1998Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents229 cited

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  • 2010Persuasion by Cheap Talk218 cited
  • Cited by

    • 2021Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment62 cited
    • 2017Divide and Inform: Rationing Information to Facilitate Persuasion60 cited
    • 2016The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: A Bayesian persuasion perspective38 cited