Delegation in Hard Times: The Financial Management of Arm's Length Bodies in the UK

Abstract

Abstract This paper explores the effectiveness of financial management tools in regulating the use of resources by arm's length bodies (ALBs) in a period of fiscal stress. The paper presents research undertaken into the implementation of a new financial management tool for ALBs in the UK since the 2008 financial crisis. Drawing on conflict ambiguity theory, the paper shows how the effectiveness of such tools is affected by deep‐rooted tensions implicit within public governance. This gives rise to micro‐level conflict over the means of achieving fiscal regulation, underpinned by macro‐level ambiguity over the logic of governance pursued by the government.

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