On What There is Not

Abstract

entities, were they thinking only that it would be more convenient . . . was there not a suggestion that their reason for renouncing them was that they did not believe in their existence?' ([I7], p. 148). Quine insinuates that there are no decisive rational argumentative or dialectical methods for choice of conceptual scheme, so we are 'thrown back on pragmatic conON WHAT THERE IS NOT I73 This content downloaded from 207.46.13.167 on Thu, 21 Jul 2016 04:26:33 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms because the criteria for what is said to exist are open to haggling, and are to some extent theory-dependent, that it is thought that what exists is also open to human negotiation, and is theory relative. What is theory relative is what theories assert to exist and, differently, are committed to the existence of, not what exists. (The confusion is like that, already noted, underlying applications of Occam's razor.) Of course, what exists, and what a theory maintains exists are connected, again through truth. If a theory is true and asserts that c's exist (or is committed to the existence of c's), then c's exist. 7 But truth cannot be here whittled down in the manner of pragmatism, to acceptability or the like, without correspondingly weakening the conclusion. Yet this is precisely what Quine, and many others, have tried to do. Quine divided the question 'What things or sorts of things exist?' into two questions: (i) What, according to a given theory, exists? (In Quinean terms: What are the ontological commitments of a given theory); (2z) Which theories have we a good reason to accept as true? (Chihara [zo]; according to Gochet [i], p. 142, 'this faithfully reports the views of

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