The ΈNEPΓIA-KINHΣIΣ Distinction and Aristotle's Conception of ΠPAΞIΣ

Abstract

The 'ENEPFEIA-KINHZIZ Distinction and Aristotle's Conception of FIPAEIZ CltARLES T. IIAGEN I)F.SI'ITE THe 1.'AC:Tthat he often makes received opinions (gzv6o~ct) the starting points in his investigations, Aristotle's conclusions sonaetimes seem paradoxical . One passage which appears to wear an air of paradox is his wellknown discussion of/~v~2yetctt and • in Metaphysics 9.6. no48b18-35. There Aristotle introduces what he is talking about with the label "actions [rt0dtgec0v]" in no48bn8, yet within just a few lines he is saying that the class thus introduced does not count as action.' As will be seen, there is reason to think that the paradox here is only verbal, llowever, two recent studies of the doctrine in this passage have made Aristotle give voice to a paradox which it will be harder to explain away." According to their authors, Aristotle is using the action label to introduce a grouping of both states and nonstates . Not only that, but they are states which Aristotle uhimately declares actions in the fldl sense. The Ul)shot of the passage, on this interpretation, is I would like to thank Sarah C

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