What is Wrong with Reflective Equilibria?

Abstract

One aspect of John Rawls’ moral philosophy, in particular, seems to be surviving the critical onslaught that greeted the publication of A Theory of Justice : his approach to moral justification, an approach we may refer to as ‘reflective equilibrium’ methodology. 1 It is often said that, if nothing else, Rawls has at least succeeded in spelling out for us the way in which the justification of moral principles does, and ought to proceed. 2 This is not to say that reflective equilibrium methodology has escaped criticism; indeed it has not. 3 Much of this criticism has centred upon the apparent circularity inherent in this methodology. But supporters have been quick to respond. They claim that most of these criticisms are off target; most of these criticisms, they say, focus merely upon ‘narrow’ reflective equilibrium methodology, whereas it is really ‘wide’ reflective equilibrium methodology that Rawls is advocating. And, although this methodology, its proponents will admit, is, to some degree, circular, this circularity, they claim, is the sort that is unobjectionable. So, in spite of the criticisms to which it has been subjected, reflective equilibrium methodology continues to be widely regarded as the most promising and sophisticated approach to moral justification yet. I want to argue here that on the contrary, this approach to moral justification is seriously mistaken. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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