The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics

Alfred Tarski

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Philosophy, Science, and History Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

Abstract

X is true if, and only if, p. [...] we shall call a definition of truth “adequate” if all these equivalences follow from it. [...] The definition of truth which was outlined above [...] implies all equivalences of the form (T). In this connnection it is important to notice that the conditions for the material adequacy of the definition determine uniquely the extension of the term “true.” Therefore, every definition of truth which is materially adequate would necessarily be equivalent to that actually constructed. The semantic conception of truth gives us, so to speak, no possibility of choice between variaous non-equivalent definitions of this notion..

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2004Aristotle on Truth 1993On rigorous definitions 2014Defending the Correspondence Theory of Truth 2001Towards a Radical Constructivist Understanding of Science 2015Cognition, Content, and the A Priori 1991On the Propositional Attitudes 2003Which notion of implication is the right one? From logical considerations to a didactic perspective 2014Grounded Theory Methodology: Positivism, Hermeneutics, and Pragmatism

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