Platonic Virtue Theory and Business Ethics

Abstract

It is a commonplace of contemporary moral theory to divide normative ethics into deontological and teleological. Both of these theories attempt to answer the question: What ought I to do? Therefore their object is actions rather than agents. The most common teleological theory in morals is utilitarian; utilitarian moral theory emphasizes the concept of good, and what is right is determined, according to classical utilitarians, as that which is productive of the greatest good for the greatest number. The deontologist, on the contrary, believes that right (or duty), rather than good, is the fundamental moral concept. That which is right ought to be done simply because it is the right thing to do or is our duty. In either case, virtue is handmaiden to another (central) moral concept; that is, in the former case, it is a disposition to produce the greatest possible good and, in the latter, a disposition to do what is morally right or our moral duty. What in recent years has been called virtue ethics, however, has a different thrust. Virtue ethics theorists, in the main, take their inspiration from ancient Greek philosophers, especially Aristotle. This movement is often traced back to works by Elizabeth Anscombe and Philippa Foot.1 They attempt to make virtue and vice, and therefore the agent, basic to moral theory rather than the intrinsic Tightness of, or morally good consequences of, actions. However Alasdair Maclntyre (After Virtue) is the most influential virtue ethics theorist.2 Maclntyre, Anscombe, and Foot take a neo-Aristotelian approach to virtue ethics. Given the consensus, at least among philosophers who do business ethics, that some knowledge of ethical theory is necessary in order to deal intelligently with moral problems in corporate business, it is

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