The central aim of this article is to specify the ontological nature of constitutive mechanistic phenomena (that is, of phenomena that are explained in constitutive mechanistic explanations). After identifying three criteria of adequacy that any plausible approach to constitutive mechanistic phenomena must satisfy, we present four different suggestions, found in the mechanistic literature, of what mechanistic phenomena might be. We argue that none of these suggestions meets the criteria of adequacy. According to our analysis, constitutive mechanistic phenomena are best understood as what we will call ‘object-involving occurrents’. Furthermore, on the basis of this notion, we will clarify what distinguishes constitutive mechanistic explanations from etiological ones. 1 Introduction2 Criteria of Adequacy2.1 Descriptive adequacy2.2 Constitutive–etiological distinction2.3 Constitution3 The Ontological Nature of Constitutive Mechanistic Phenomena3.1 Phenomena as input–output relations3.2 Phenomena as end states3.3 Phenomena as dispositions3.4 Phenomena as behaviours4 Phenomena as Object-Involving Occurrents4.1 What object-involving occurrents are and why we need them4.2 The object in the phenomenon4.3 The adequacy of option (5)5 Conclusion
Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 116 citations exist upstream.
Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.