Alternative Models of Appeal Mobilization in Judicial Hierarchies

Abstract

Since agenda choices of courts set the parameters of decisions on the merits, political scientists have focused more attention in recent years on the process by which judicial agenda choices are made. This paper examines the agenda process by considering the factors affecting the mobilization of appeals from the intermediate to final appellate levels in the English judicial system. Two models of agenda mobilization are evaluated in bivariate and multivariate formats. One posits that access to a court of last resort is one of the resources distributed by a legal system and that the ability to obtain an additional appeal is related to the relative capacity of litigants to compete in ajudicial system. The other focuses upon how an intermediate appellate court uses institutional rules and resources to encourage or dissuade litigants from seeking further appeal in the court of last resort. The multivariate analysis shows that agenda mobilization is primarily a function of institutional resources committed by the Court of Appeal and that the court at the intermediate level thus contributes in important ways to how appeals are mobilized in the court of last resort.

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