Policy, Politics, and Public Utility Regulation

Abstract

A typology of issues, based on a theory of public advocacy in regulatory proceedings, helps to explain differences in utility regulatory politics and policies. The theory focuses on grass-roots advocates (citizen groups) and proxy advocates (state officials such as the attorney general or a consumer counsel). The issues involve different levels of technical complexity and consumer conflict. It is hypothesized that grass-roots advocates will be effective when issues are low in technical complexity, while proxy advocates will be effective when issues are low in consumer conflict. An analysis of aggregate data from 51 public utility commissions confirms these expectations, through multiple regression analysis and probit analysis in four issue areas. Case studies derived from interviews with 284 public advocates, utility company executives, and public utility regulators in 12 states support the aggregatelevel findings. The assumption that every regulatory issue is inherently complex and conflictive ought to be abandoned. Within the same regulatory policy domain, issues differ in complexity and conflict, with important policy consequences.

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