Explanatory Knowledge and Metaphysical Dependence

Abstract

There is a famous remark Aristotle made about knowledge: Men do not think they know a thing unless they have grasped the 'why' of (Physics II, ch. 3; see also Metaphysics V, ch. 2). This remark is often quoted by writers on scientific explanation to underline the importance of explanation to scientific knowledge, and why, as philosophers, we should concern ourselves with understanding what explanation is -that is, to show that analyzing scientific explanation, or building a model of explanation, is a reputable philosophical enterprise. It is not uncommon to invoke Aristotle not only to stress the centrality of explanation to science but also to motivate a distinction between explanatory knowledge and descriptive knowledge -knowing why from knowing that.1 We are told, for example, that to know that the spectral lines of light received from distant celestial bodies show a shift toward red, but quite another to know why these red shifts occur. The former, it is suggested, is merely knowing a fact, but the latter involves something deeper and more

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