The Role of Legislators in the Determination of Interest Group Influence

Abstract

In addition to structuring the rules governing legislator-lobbyist interactions, legislators also affect their interactions with lobbyists by promoting lobbying enterprises, which are groups of like-minded lobbyists and their legislative allies, all of whom seek to coordinate their efforts. The long-term relationships inherent in lobbying enterprises reduce uncertainties, insure ready access to legislators, and allow lobbyists to reach undecided legislators indirectly. Lobbying enterprises complement staff systems, the committee system, and members' constituent contact committees. This article concludes with specific suggestions for incorporating concepts developed here into empirical and formal theoretic work on lobbying influence.

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