A Coherence Theory of Autonomy

Abstract

To be autonomous is to be self-governed. An individual acts autonomously when he acts on his own reasons. Thus, in order to understand autonomous action, we must know what it is for a reason to count as one's own; and thus, we need a working conception of what constitutes 'the self'. In this paper, I propose a conception of the self and a coherentist theory of autonomous action. I focus here on autonomy rather than on freedom. In so doing, I aim to limit the discussion to one of the two features of which any plausible analysis of freedom ought to give some account: (i) the availability of alternative possibilities, and (ii) self-determination.' The first condition is meant to capture the idea that, in order for an agent's act at a particular time to be performed freely, it must be the case that the agent can do otherwise than that act at that time. Discussions about the correct interpretation of this feature center on ambiguities in the word 'can'. The second condition is the requirement of autonomy: a free act, as opposed to an unfree act, is one that results from the agent herself (or, from the state of affairs of her being a certain way), rather than from something external to her. My understanding of autonomy is motivated primarily by two considerations. First is the fact that we, as persons, not only have beliefs and desires, but we have the capacity to reflect on our desires and beliefs, forming attitudes toward them.2 These higher-order mental states (that is, mental states that have as their intentional object another mental state) are prominent in

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