Truth and Demonstratives

Abstract

Recently, various philosophers have argued that there is a close connection between a theory of truth for a language and a theory of meaning for that language (e.g., [1]). Even if we do not wish to equate two, I believe we must agree that a necessary component of an adequate theory of meaning is a theory of truth. We might require a complete semantical theory of a language to do many things, but it should at least give us a systematic account of conditions under which sentences of that language are true. If we grant that provision of a truth definition is a condition of adequacy on a theory of meaning for some language, then we are faced with a difficulty when we embark on project of framing semantical theories for natural languages. These languages contain what Quine has called non-eternal sentences, i.e., sentences whose truth value may vary from one occasion of utterance to another. The linguistic devices which make for non-eternality of sentences containing them are so-called indicator words: personal pronouns I, he, ''she, demonstrative pronouns this, that, tensed verbs, etc. The problem about sentences containing these devices is that they are, from a semantical point of view, incomplete expressions. Frege noted that the mere wording [of a sentence containing indicator words] . . . is not complete expression of thought, but knowledge of certain accompanying conditions of utterance, which are used as means of expressing thought, are needed for its correct apprehension ([2]: 24). Consider, for example, sentence,

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