Replacing Functional Reduction with Mechanistic Explanation

Abstract

Recently the functional model of reduction has become something like the standard model of reduction in philosophy of mind.In this paper, I argue that the functional model fails as an account of reduction due to problems related to three key concepts: functionalization, realization and causation.I further argue that if we try to revise the model in order to make it more coherent and scientifically plausible, the result is merely a simplified version of what in philosophy of science is known as mechanistic explanation.Hence, instead of analyzing reduction in philosophy of mind in terms of functional reduction, it should be analyzed in terms of mechanistic explanation.

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