A Theoretical Model of Economic Nationalism in New and Developing States

Abstract

Nationalism in new and developing states is a complex problem of increasing concern to both political scientists and economists. This chapter provides an explanation in the form of a theoretical model of economic nationalism in new and developing states. The development of the model of economic nationalism starts from Downs’ model of the working of democracy. The theoretical model presented derives primarily from three recent applications of economic theory to problems hitherto not generally considered to fall within its range. The first of these is Gary S. Becker’s study of discrimination against Negroes in the United States. The second source of the model is Anthony Downs’ application of economic theory to the processes and practices of democratic government. The third source of the model is Albert Breton’s analysis of the economics of nationalism. The cultural nationalism complements economic nationalism, both involving tangible benefits in the form of protection of the market for the services of individuals.

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