Exhibitionism and the Antitheatrical Prejudice

Abstract

PERSON, says Hobbes, i s he, whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of another man . . . whether truly or by fiction. When they are considered as his own, then is he called a natural person: and when they are considered as representing the words and actions of another, then is he a feigned or artificial person. 1 Hobbes' distinction between the two forms of personation may serve set forth the common ground, as well as mark the boundary, between two modes of theatricality: the sustaining of a feigned person-or mimicry-and the emphatic maintaining of one's own person, or self-manifestation. The Oxford Dictionary supplies similar coordinates for the verbs and act, which may mean either sustain a feigned character, make a pretence, act deceitfully -i. e., engage in mimicry or hypocrisy -or, more neutrally, pursue a course of action, to perform a function -to go about one's business in a normal manner. A man who has played his part has done what was expected of him; he has fulfilled the obligations contracted by performing similar actions in the past. But most men play their parts somewhat inexpertly; they fail coincide exactly with their assumed roles. And our language contains various expressions of disapproval for those who too grossly misplay themselves. Terms like showing off, playing the gallery, upstaging, making a scene, making a spectacle of oneself, all refer an insistence on being at the center of attention. The same notion appears in other languages: in Italian, for example, sta sempre sul podio -he's always on a platform -refers bitingly the man who cannot do without an audience. To make a spectacle of oneself means that one is affording undesirable amusement others, though not necessarily by de-

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 19 citations exist upstream.