Mill on Liberty and Morality

Abstract

PARTS I and II of this paper set out Mill's theory of liberty in three main principles. Part I tries to establish the content of the leading principle of the theory, the Principle of Liberty, and to show from its form that it requires further principles to go with it. Part II supplies two further principles and comments on the application of the theory. Parts III and IV argue that there is a tension in Mill's theory of liberty as to what counts as conduct harmful to others, and that this tension is traceable to his conception of morality. In particular Mill needs to reconcile the Principle of Liberty with his belief in the enforceability of morality. The reconciliation he attempts imposes severe constraints on the content of morality and commits him to a more negative conception of morality than is commonly attributed to him. The relevant aspects of his view are embodied in two further principles. Parts V and VI consider the implications of Mill's conception of morality for the kind of utilitarianism which he could consistently hold, and argue that his ability to reconcile his secondary principles with the Principle of Utility reflects the fact that the Principle of Utility is not itself a moral principle. A short epilogue suggests that in arriving at a synthesis which embodies all five of the secondary principles referred to, together with some version of the Principle of Utility, Mill has achieved consistency at the cost of truth.

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