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The debates between Bertrand Russell and Alexius Meinong from 1904 to i920 dealt with some fundamental issues in philosophy: reference, nonexistent objects, intentionality. Along with the enduring influence of Russell's philosophy, some misapprehensions about these exchanges have persisted. One is that Russell's objections to Meinong were definitive. The other stems from taking too seriously Russell's casual remark in i91 8 that Meinong's theories evidenced a deficient sense of reality. Contrary to the impression left by this comment, Russell, during the most intensive years of the debate (1904-1907), felt a real respect for Meinong's theories,' and his main concern lay elsewhere. The exchange did not center on reality or realism, as is often believed, but on the classical laws of logic (noncontradiction, excluded middle) and the correct analysis of logical form, for instance, of existence statements. Russell also took a dim view of the modal concepts Meinong used to support the canons of object theory, but his main concern was that Meinong's overall analysis appeared to threaten the foundation of Russell's philosophical logic. Russell and Meinong's disagreement thus came down to competing logical frameworks tied to different notions of what it is to be an object. In claiming that Russell's main objection to Meinong's theory was logical, I do not mean to deny that ontology and metaphysics were in the forefront of Russell's concerns up to i9i0 or that for him a correct foundational view of logic would tell us much about the way the world is. Russell's motivation for criticizing Meinong may well have been a concern with what is 'real', but his philosophical reasons for rejecting Meinong's
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