Decision Strategies of the Legislative Budget Analyst: Economist or Politician?

Abstract

This work describes and classifies the budgeting behavior of legislative analysts from nine southern states and then compares their decision orientations with executive analysts from the same states. The research methodology employs a laboratory approach, exposing analysts to budgetary scenarios and then recording their responses. Social judgment analysis is used to quantify the decisions of analysts based on their weighting of the defined factors included in hypothetical state agency budget requests. These factors represent economic, incremental, and political cues familiar to analysts responsible for the review of such requests for legislators. Results indicate mixed support for several hypotheses. For example, unlike executive analysts, most legislative analysts cannot be classified as mixed value in their decision orientations, as proposed—relying on both political and economic factors about equally when preparing agency budget recommendations for legislators. Nevertheless, those so described do indicate heavier reliance on legislative over gubernatorial agenda. Also, none of the legislative analysts, compared with 6 percent of executive analysts, utilize budget base as the primary decision cue when they review agency budgets. On the other hand, 19 percent of the legislative analysts do consider agency acquisitiveness an important budgetary cue, second in importance to agency workload. Results do indicate a distinctiveness among legislative analysts according to personal characteristics. Younger, female analysts with fewer years of service and in the lower salary ranges are the least likely to consider legislative direction important when they review budgets. Positive support for one hypothesis is evidenced. Legislative analysts exhibit heavier reliance on economic factors and consider a broader range of the political factors supplied in the simulation than do their executive counterparts. Given that most of these analysts consider legislative agenda a secondary—and for many even an unimportant—cue, they can be described collectively as more objective in their decision orientations than executive budget analysts. It may be satisfying to budget reformers, among others, that legislative analysts seem to be communicating an objective perspective on budget matters that is useful to those with the power to enact policy.

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