Inquiry into Democracy: What Might a Pragmatist Make of Rational Choice Theories?

Abstract

We begin by positing a conception of pragmatism that is characterized by three basic philosophical commitments: consequentialism, fallibilism, and anti-skepticism. In light of that conception we challenge prevalent views that hold that pragmatism entails no particular moral and political positions. We argue instead that pragmatism generally has democratic implications and, more specifically, that it has implications for the assessment and justification of political institutions. To develop this position we draw in part on the political insights of Dewey. Dewey argued that the greater social and economic complexity of twentieth century life creates significant problems for democratic society and its institutions. The most important of these problems is that growing complexity makes it difficult for a democratic public to effectively identify either itself or its enduring interests. In lieu of a specific remedy, Dewey proposed a form of social inquiry that can, by entering into democratic deliberation, contribute to the process by which the public might more readily define its common interests and, thereby, itself. We argue that rational choice theory can assist us in undertaking such a pragmatist social inquiry. We draw on two main bodies of recent research-on the political economy of U.S. macroeconomic policy and on mechanism design-to show the relevance of the rational choice approach. We argue both that this research reinforces pragmatist preoccupation with democratic deliberation and, because pragmatists are naive about institutional matters, that their preoccupation is very nearly utopian in the pejorative sense.

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