The Myth of the Essential Indexical

Abstract

A strong contemporary current runs to effect that ability of an agent to project knowledge of world into relevant action in world depends upon ability to think indexical thoughts. For example, if I wish to get to Boston, it may be helpful to know that 8:25 train goes there. But I cannot put this knowledge to use unless I also come to know, at some point, that there [a place indexed via perception] is 8:25 train. Similarly, should my life be endangered by an approaching bear, it might help me to know it. But it will not be enough for me to know of this danger to me under some impersonal description of me such as the person sitting in Bruno's favorite berry or even under name unless I further know that I am person in Bruno's favorite berry patch or that I am Ruth Millikan (I might not know, for example, should I be amnesiac.) But this kind of thought-there is 8:25, I am Ruth Millikan-is, it is supposed, indexical. Thus Dennett, summing up literature, remarks Indexicality of sentences appears to be linguistic counterpart of that relativity to a subjective point of view that is a hallmark of mental states (Dennett 1987, p. 132).' He clarifies using a (ubiquitous) quotation in which Perry remarks When you and I have beliefs under common character of 'A bear is about to attack me' we behave similarly . . . [whereas] . . . when you and I both apprehend that I am about to be attacked by a bear we behave differently (Perry 1977, p. 494). That is, our behaviors hinge not so much on

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