On the ontology of psychological attributes

Abstract

Coherent interpretations of many claims about measurement in the psychological sciences depend on philosophically realist commitments regarding the psychological attributes purportedly being measured. However, what it means to be a realist regarding psychological attributes has not been clarified, and this may contribute to the reluctance of psychometricians and others to embrace realist positions. This paper attempts to clarify what a psychological attribute might believably be. Drawing on conceptual resources provided by Searle’s (1992) biological naturalism, as well as other perspectives from the philosophies of mind and language, it is argued that psychological attributes can, in principle, be said to exist. On the realist perspective, the existence of an attribute is a necessary but insufficient condition for its measurability. However, existence is not the same as immutability or independence from human intentionality, and the role that humans play in creating psychological attributes cannot be ignored.

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