Legal Mobilization for Social Reform: Power and the Politics of Agenda Setting

Abstract

This article develops an agenda setting framework for studying the role of American courts in protecting and promoting the interests of the politically disadvantaged. Drawing from work on agenda setting processes in local political systems, the author presents a framework that examines the ways in which varying configurations of organizational power influence the types of issues that reach lower court agendas. The framework and its implications are illustrated with findings from empirical research on legal mobilization on behalf of the poor by federally funded legal services lawyers. The article shows the variety of mechanisms employed by powerful local interests to constrain poverty lawyers who wish to mobilize issues of social reform. The findings suggest that judicial agendas may reflect prevailing distributions of power to a much greater extent than is implied by conventional views of the legal system's utility in effecting social reform.

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