Secularism And Freedom of Religion: The Approach of the European Court of Human Rights

Abstract

This Article focuses on the approach of the European Court of Human Rights, based in Strasbourg, concerning the relationship between secularism and freedom of religion and the application of the “margin of appreciation doctrine.” Through the investigation of the relevant jurisprudence of the Court dealing with religious freedom and the principle of secularism (theŞahin, Dahlab,andLautsicases), the Author demonstrates that Court jurisprudence is moving from the application of principles of “pluralist secularism” toward a “fundamentalist approach” to secularism. Having evaluated themodus operandiof the Court in the light of the competing interests at stake, the Author suggests that in deciding cases where secularism and freedom to manifest religion collide, the Court should follow a case-by-case approach primarily aimed at protecting individual liberties and has to consider the political and cultural background of each situation and the effective impact on the State's life of the individual behavior.

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