Severing the Electoral Connection: Shirking in the Contemporary Congress

Abstract

Studies of representation focusing on legislative shirking tend to offer an interesting tension: when the opportunity presents itself, it seems that exiting members do not change their votinq behavior (ideological shirking) but do reduce their effort level by voting less (participatory shirking). Our analysis avoids the pitfalls of prior studies by defining a simple, quasi-experimental, research design contrasting those certain that they are seeking reelection with those sure that they are departing the House for the102nd, 103rd, and 104th Congresses (1991-1996). We measure changes in ideology and participation using all roll-call votes in the last six months of election years, controlling for possible member selection effects and short-term influences, and show that legislators are disposed toward ideological and participatory shirking while selection effects are unimportant. Thus, we reconcile results seemingly at odds and suggest that policies affecting member turnover, such as term limits, can interfere with representation. A fundamental issue concerning political representation is the extent to which the necessity of reelection constrains officeholders. If incumbents plan to retire, thus freeing themselves of their electoral shackles, or if they pursue higher office and face a distinct constituency, will they behave differently? Or do members continue to behave in the same manner even in the absence of an electoral connection to the districts they represent? Answers to such questions have important implications for how we understand and model the representative process. Additionally, they have ramifications for the likely impact of public policy choices that affect member turnover rates, such as the imposition of term limits, on the political system. A primary means of drawing inferences regarding shirking-which we simply define as legislator behavior that differs from what would be observed given perfect monitoring and effective punishment by constituents-is to determine if politicians change their behavior when electoral discipline is removed. Most notably, scholars examine members' actions during their last period in office, on the grounds that those voluntarily departing can behave according to a distinct set of preferences, even if they run afoul of their districts or of their electoral coalitions. Empirical results on final period behavior are voluminous and sometimes contradictory (Bender and Lott 1996). Nevertheless, two general inferences seem to have gathered support. First, there is little evidence for shirking in terms of vote choice (ideological shirking).' While, as we will discuss shortly, there are a variety of potential explanations for such nonfindings, one intuitive and frequently offered reason is that they reflect member-specific selection effects. This implies that

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