Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Epistemological Dogmatism

Abstract

Foundationalism and coherentism each contain significant epistemological truths. Both positions are, moreover, intellectually influential even outside epistemology: even when neither position is mentioned, one or the other of them often affects philosophical discussion of other topics. It is doubtful that any thesis in either spectrum can be cogently defended unless it captures important points associated with the opposing side. But the construction and defense of such a balanced thesis is difficult, and most philosophers defending either tradition have been mainly concerned to argue for their view and against the other tradition, which they have often interpreted through just one leading proponent. It is not surprising, then, that although the foundationalism-coherentism controversy remains a focus of epistemological attention, philosophers in each tradition often feel misunderstood by those in the other. Indeed, while both foundationalism and coherentism have often been set out and discussed,' there remains much unclarity about them: about their basic concepts, their central claims, and the main arguments supporting them. The unclarity goes beyond what one would expect from terminological and philosophical diversity: there are genuine obscurities and misconceptions to be dispelled. Many objections to foundationalism and various criticisms of coherentism rest on unclarity or misunderstanding. My aim in Sections I through III is to clarify both types of position. I hope thereby to advance our understanding of

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