Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political Economy of Oil States

Abstract

The relationship between oil and politics has generated much intellectual debate. The resulting framework called has produced a number of propositions about the nature of the developmental process. A prominent theme contends that the financial autonomy of oil states grants them immunity from social pressures. I argue that no necessary link exists between the accumulation of wealth and a particular social outcome. The windfall profits of petroleum exports do not translate into a politically quiescent population. Oil states often foster their own civil opposition because of the way revenues are deployed. The rentier framework is limited because it relegates political choices to a back seat, behind structural economics. Its utility is enhanced if we construct more explicit linkages between state strategies of expenditure and the political consequences for particular social groups. I integrate the conditions of rentierism and personal rule to explain the creation and convergence of dissent in oil states and give substance to the oft-repeated call for the rule of law (hukm al qanun).

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