Is There Immediate Justification?

Abstract

Pure coherentists claim that a belief can only be justified by its relations to other beliefs. Impure coherentists are willing to give some non-beliefs, such as perceptual experiences, a justifying role. They will just deny that those states are able to justify a belief all by themselves. Many foundationalists believe in justification-making facts that violate that constraint. Some philosophers argue for the strong thesis that it is impossible for justified beliefs ever to be formed by deliberate choice. Notice that, to satisfy inductivism non-trivially, a view must hold that, at least sometimes, justifiers can be proposition. The view according to which facts about mental states can be justifiers satisfies inductivism.

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