Overpaid? Public Service Delivery and City Manager Compensation in California

Abstract

City manager compensation has received heightened scrutiny in the media and in public debate. High salaries for city managers are sometimes compared with the salaries of elected officials, but this might not be the best comparison if we consider the nature of their work. If city managers are responsible for municipal corporations, then the scope of the municipal enterprise should explain compensation practices. Because California cities vary in the scope of services provided, we test an enterprise argument. The analysis makes a distinction between the scope of direct service delivery and contract service delivery by cities. Elite interviews with search firms in California provide additional insight into compensation practices. We conclude with paths for future research and discuss normative implications consistent with the enterprise framework for governing bodies to consider as they set city manager compensation.

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