ResTING CONTeNT : seNsIBLe sATIsFICING?

Abstract

It is an assumption of standard decision theory that rationality requires maximizing: trying to get the maximum amount of whatever form of value we are after (usually construed as utility). An alternative has been proposed, under the heading of satisficing being satisfied with what suffices, as it were: settling for an option that is good enough. But this may seem rational only when there are costs to determining which option is best that diminish the value of choosing it, to the point where the choice of a merely satisfactory option really amounts to maximizing. Where there is no serious cost, even in time and effort, to getting hold of something better a vacation in Rome rather than the Riviera how could it be rational to turn it down?

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